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INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, cognitive-behavioral theories of

d~pression

have increasingly incorporated both cognitive and environmental parameters to account for the complex symptomology present in depressive
disorders.

These theories place primary emphasis on the role of cog-

nitions in determining emotions;

that is, one's beliefs about events

are seen as central to depressive emotions.

Considerable research

supports these contentions.
Recent research by Bower (1981) provides additional data conearning the relationship between emotion and cognition.
that emotion serves as a memory
with coincident events.

uni~

Bower suggests

that enters into associations

Activation of this emotion aids in retrieval

of events associated with it and prime themes for other cognitive
processes.

.

In the group of studies associated with this theory, Bower

has obtained significant results relating hypnotically-induced emotions
and cognitive processes.
While Bower's research has significant implications for theories
of depression, two questions arise from this research.

The first

concerns demand compliances resulting from the hypnotic manipulations.
Although Bower has defended this criticism with related research,
additional studies should be carried out.
to the generalizability of Bower's results.
1

A second question is related
The generalizability of

2

these results may be evidenced if research in naturalistic settings
also found a relationship between emotions and cognitive processes.
partial replications in normal or clinical settings using subjects
with naturally-occurring emotions might adequately demonstrate the
relevance of Bower's findings.

With this in mind, Gundersen (Note 1)

demonstrated a relationship between affect and cognitions while studying various degrees of unmanipulated (naturally-occurring) depression
in a normal college population.

The present study was designed to

expand further upon Bower's research and clarify the relationship between affect and cognitions in a clinical setting.
relationship of depression to:

Specifically, the

the content of affect-laden word

recall, ratings of affect-laden stimuli, the amount of total recall,
the amount and affect of interjections, the ordering of recall, and
associations to neutral words were observed.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Introduction
Philosophers have related affect and cognitions for 2000 years.
Kant suggested that reason synthesizes experiences according to its
own nature and our understanding of the outside world is possible only
in terms of our modes of perception.

Kant's philosophy maintained that

the laws of man determined what laws of nature can be discovered.
Dynamic theorists have also addressed the issue of the relationship
between affect and cognitions for nearly 90 years (James, 1890;
McDougall, 1921).

In the last decade cognition and affect have again

become major areas of theory and research in depression following
several years of inactivity due tp the popularity of strict behaviorism
and its extreme stimulus-response approach.

One reason some researchers

have returned to studying cognition is that many responses are not
predictable from the stimulus situation alone.

Cognitive events inter-

vene between the two to sufficiently warrant attention.

In this short

time, some theorists have come to view affective states from both
operant and cognitive terms.
The following sections will be devoted to contemporary theories
and relevant issues about depression as viewed by cognitive-behavioral
researchers.
fined.

First, three ways of classifying depression will be de-

Next, an extended view of the cognitive determinants of depres-

sion will be presented.

Regarding this theme, several researchers have
3
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proposed that depressed people interpret their world and themselves
differently than nondepressives (Beck, 1972; Ferster, 1974; Rehm, Note
2; Seligman, 1975).

Recent research by Bower (1981) suggests that

emotions powerfully influence specific cognitive processes through an
associative network process.
In summary, this review intends to show the increasing use of
cognitive explanations to depressive behavior.

Specific attention

will be given to research relating depression to selective attention,
memory, and associations.
Classifying Depression
Researchers classify and define depression in a variety of ways
from a simple mood state to a complex syndrome consisting of behavioral,
cognitive, affective, and physiological parameters (Becker, 1974).

In

general, these classifications fall into three groups (Roth, 1977):
a) qualitative classifications, b) dimensional or trait classifications,
and c) cognitive-behavioral classifications.
The first group of classifications consists of theorists who
have adopted a symptom cluster model and propose "qualitatively" distinct types of depression.

Types of depression are differentiated on

the basis of symptomology, etiology, response to treatment and background factors (age, family history, etc.).

In the past, one of the

most frequently used nosological systems was the American Psychiatric
Association Diagnostic Criteria (DSM II, 1968).
syndromes cited were:

The seven affective

psychiatric depressive reaction, manic depression-
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depressed type; manic depression-manic type; manic depression-circular type; involutional depression, neurotic depressive reactions, and
cyclothymic personality.

Each subtype was differentiated from the

other on the basis of etiological and/or symptomatic factors.

For

instance, both psychotic and neurotic depressive reactions were thought
to be precipitated by environmental stresses while the remaining subtypes were related to physiological constitutional, and genetic
variables.

Similarly, manic-depressive patterns were discriminated

from involutional-depression on the basis of past symptoms, and from
cyclothymia on the basis of symptom severity.
Recently, the diagnostic criteria were revised (DSM III, 1980).
The revision lists the following affective disorders: major depression,
single episode; major depression, recurrent; bi-polar disorder, mixed;
bi-polar disorder, manic; bi-polar disorder, depressed; cyclothymic;
and depressive neurosis.

Each subtype is differentiated from the other

on the basis of three axes: clinical syndromes, personality and developmental disorders, and physical disorders and conditions.

In addition

to those distinctions, a clinician can also use two additional axes to
supplement diagnoses:

severity of psychosocial stressors and highest

level of adaptive functioning in the past year.
Another proponent of the qualitative classification of depressions is Winokur and his associates (1970) who have differentiated
subtypes of depression in terms of depressive symptoms and the presence
of other psychiatric disorders.

He has made distinctions between grief

6

reactions, primary affective disturbance and secondary affective disturbance.

A grief reaction is considered a loss induced, transient

depressive episode.

A diagnosis of primary affective reaction is given

if the client has no other psychiatric disorder, and secondary affective
reaction is indicated when a preexisting psychiatric dysfunction was
evident.

Winokur further divides primary affective reactions into

unipolar subgroups along a similar line of thinking.
Another type of qualitative classification of depression is employed through sophisticated statistical instruments.

Cluster analyses

(Everitt, 1972) and factor analytic procedures (Fleiss, Lawlor, Platman,

& Fieve, 1971) have been used to isolate qualitatively distinct types
and subtypes of depression.

Grinker, Miller, Sabashin, Nunn, and

Nunally (1961) performed one of the earliest factor analytic studies
of depression.

The resulting types were:

empty depression, angry

depression, hypochondriacal depression, and anxiety depression.

Fried-

man, Cowitz, Cohen and Granick (1963) isolated subtypes similar to that
of Grinker et al. (1961).
The second group of classifications conceptualizing depression
is a family of disorders, each of which differs with regard to the
severity or intensity of experienced symptomology.

This type of class-

ification is called the "dimensional" or "trait" conceptualization of
depression.

Unlike type theorists, a trait theorist does not view

depression as encompassing a variety of qualitatively distinct syndromes.
Distinct syndromes may exist but they are viewed as being reduceable to
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a finite number of common dimensions in which individual differences
are best represented as gradations along a single dimension (unidimensional system), or along a combination of several dimensions (multidimensional system).

A second assumption of this approach to class-

ification is that the nature of the depression has a basic underlying
feature, that is, a client is seen as "generally depressed."

It is

also assumed that the depression is a covariation of one or more of
discrete symptoms (or traits) which are obtained by conventional
factor analytic procedures.

In essence, a trait is an artificial

entity which is defined by factoring group data rather than by
individual case.

Since a trait is independent, a high score on one

gives a researcher little or no information about an individual's
remaining traits.

Variation in blends among the basic traits accounts

for the variability of clinical depressions (Rosenthal & Gudeman,
1967).
A variety of unidimensional systems has been derived.

For

example, Klerman (1971) and Zubin and Fleiss (1971) state that psychotic
and neurotic depressions are not qualitatively distinct and only differ
in regard to symptom intensity.

Similarly, Kendell (1968) and Kendell

and Gourlay (1970) suggest that the traditional endogenous-reactive
dichotomy (Harmilton & White, 1959; Kiloh & Garside, 1963) may instead
be symptom clusters occupying opposing ends of a single depressive
trait.
Multidimensional trait systems are common in the field.

The

8

variety may in part be attributed to use of different subject populations (inpatient,

outpatient~

college students) and different measures

of depression (MMPI-D, Beck Depression Inventory, Multiple. Depression
Inventory).

The common theme contained in all these multidimensional

systems is that underlying all depressive states is a "general" depressive disorder containing several "group" or "specific" factors.
Perhaps the most investigated multidimensional system is that of
endogenous-reactive depression.

Traditionally, reactive depression

was thought to be environmentally precipitated while endogenous depression was linked to internal physiological causes.
have reported symptomatic differences.

Trait theorists

For instance, Kiloh and Garside

(1963) evaluated 92 clinically diagnosed "endogenous" or "reactive"
subjects on 35 measures (age, previous attacks, etc.).

Two factors

accounted for a large portion of the variance, a "general" depression
factor and a bi-polar factor related to the endogenous-reactive dichotomy.

Specific symptoms such as self-pity, existence of a precipitant,

inadequacy, initial insomnia, depression worse in the morning, agitation, obsessions, hypochondriacal complaints, etc. were related to the
reactive end of the dimension.

Other symptoms such as early morning

awakening, depression worse in the evening; onset in fourth decade of
life, etc. were loaded on the endogenous end of the dimension.

Similar

patterns have been found by other researchers (Carney, Roth, & Garside,
1965; Hamilton & White, 1959; Kiloh, Andrews, Nielson, & Bianchi, 1972;
Hendels

&

Cochrane, 1968).
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The third major way of classifying depression does so in terms
of the frequency of occurrence of specific behaviors, thoughts, and
physiological symptoms.

This is referred to as the cognitive-behavioral

classification of depression.
pressions are identical;

These theorists assume that no two de-

each comprise a unique set of deficits and

excesses.

No assumptions are made about covariation among depressive

symptoms.

That is, the appearance of one symptom does not suggest cer-

tain others are expected.

Ferster (1973, 1974) was one of the first

behaviorists to advance this position when he viewed depression as
involving a reduced frequency of "adjustive behaviors," an increased
frequency of avoidance and escape responses, and a passive behavioral
mode of controlling one's environment.

Variations of the basic behav-

ioral framework attributing varying degrees of importance to the cognitive component in depression have been advanced by a number of other
researchers (Beck, 1972; Rehm, 1977; Seligman, 1974, 1975; Williams,
Barlow, & Agros, 1972).

It is important to note that all of the

theories in this classification of depression in some way implicate
cognitions.

In some, the cognitive alterations are viewed as symptoms

while in others they are central to depression.

The following sections

will be devoted to contemporary cognitive-behavioral theories providing
frameworks from which one can explain both overt-motoric symptomology
and verbal-cognitive symptomology.

Both environmental and cognitive

parameters are considered causal factors.
Cognitive-Behavioral Hodels of Depression
This section is an elaboration of the previously described
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"cognitive-behavioral" classification of depression.

As stated before,

theories in this classification of depression incorporate both environmental and cognitive factors of causality to different degrees.

First,

theories heavily weighing the environmental causes of depression will
be reviewed.

The remaining cognitive-behavioral theories of depression

will be reviewed in order of increasing prominence of the cognitive
factor.
Behavioral Perspectives.

A number of theorists have suggested

that depression is related to an insufficient amount of reinforcement
(Coyne, 1976; Ferster, 1974; Lazarus, 1968; Lewinsohn, 1974, 1975;
Liberman & Raskin, 1971).

Lewinsohn and his colleagues (1974) have

developed a model of depression which best represents this viewpoint.
Classical and operant conditioning processes are both involved in their
framework.

Specifically, a low rate of response-contingent reinforce-

ments acts as an unconditional stimulus eliciting a variety of depressive symptoms (verbal statements of dysphoria, self-depreciation,
rejection, guilt, fatigue, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, headaches,
etc.).

Once elicited, these symptoms are maintained in an operant

fashion through social reinforcement (sympathy) .

A low rate of rein-

forcement places the depressed person on an extinction schedule.

Other

depressive response patterns are subsequently developed and maintained,
i.e., the behaviors cause the depressed person to be avoided, the individual receives less reinforcement, and continues to behave in
depressed ways.
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Lewinsohn (1974) argues that obtained reinforcement is a function
of:

(a) the number of events which an individual finds potentially

reinforcing;

(b) the number of potential reinforcers available; ·and

(c) the individual's ability to obtain available reinforcers.

Lewin-

sohn has primarily examined the relationship between depression and low
rates of response-contingent positive reinforcement.

The differential

amounts of reinforcement which depressed clients and their families
obtain has been systematically evaluated.

Using a verbal interaction

coding system, Lewinsohn and Shaw (1969) found that a minimal amount of
time was spent discussing topics which were reinforcing to the depressed client relative to the time spent on topics reinforcing to
the spouse.

Similar results were found in a number of naturalistic

settings (Lewinsohn & Atwood, 1969; Lewinsohn & Shaffer, 1971; Martin,
Weinstein, & Lewinsohn, Note 3).
In more rigorously controlled investigations, the emphasis remained on the covariation of mood and reinforcing activity.

Lewinsohn

and Libet (1972) examined depressed patients, nondepressed psychiatric
controls, and normal controls and found a significant correlation between their mood (Depression Adjective Checklist, 1965) and the number
of pleasant activities in which they engaged (MacPhillany and Lewinsohn
Pleasant Events Schedule, 1971).

The results of this study were repli-

cated by Lewinsohn and Graf (1973).

In a similar procedure, MacPhillany

and Lewinsohn (1974) found that depressives reported distinct types of
activities over the same period as controls.

When all subjects rated

the Pleasant Events Schedule items in terms of the reinforcing value,
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depressives' ratings were significantly lower than those of nondepressives.

This supports Lewinsohn's contention that depressives experience

fewer events or activities as potentially reinforcing.
Other researchers have reported findings to support this framework.

Wener and Rehm (1975) found that individuals receiving low

levels of reinforcement became more depressed than individuals receiving high amounts of reinforcement.

Hersen, Eisler, Alford and Agras

(1973), Lazarus (1968), Liberman and Raskin (1971), and McLean, Ogston,
and Grauer (1973) have reported that they have treated clients with low
levels of reinforcement.

Improvement in all of these cases was corre-

lated with obtaining more reinforcement.

Finally, a number of inves-

tigators have found depression to covary with the occurrence of "life
stressors" (events which a behaviorist would designate as losses of
actual or potential reinforcement).

Paykel, Meyers, Dienelt, Klerman,

Lindenthal, and Pepper (1969) found that within the six-month period
prior to interviews, depressives experienced significantly more losses
(marital, occupational, social, familial, etc.) than the controls.

The

results were essentially replicated by Leff, Roatch, and Bunney (1970)
who examined endogenous and non-endogenous inpatients.
Lewinsohn has suggested that inadequate social skills may partially account for the depressive's infrequent receipt of reinforcement.
This relationship has been-assessed in group (Lewinsohn, Weinstein, &
Alper, 1970; Libet & tewinsohn, 1973), familial (Shaffer & Lewinsohn,
Note 4), and laboratory contexts (Rosenberry, Weiss, & Lewinsohn, Note

13
5; Stewart, Note 6).

Several findings emerged.

Rosenberry et al.

(Note 5) found that depressed subjects were less predictable and homogenous in emitting rapport-inducing and supportive communications.
Libet and Lewinsohn (1973) found that depressives

~ngage

in fewer activ-

ities, emit proportionately less reinforcers, communicate with a more
restricted range of individuals, and take a longer time to respond to
a verbalization.

Stewart (Note 6) also found depressives to react

slower to verbal and non-verbal prompts than nondepressives.
All together, rather extensive data has been collected to support
Lewinsohn's hypothesis that depression is linked to low rates of
response-contingent positive reinforcement.

However, this model is

unable to account for all the complexities of depressive responses.

In

particular it can be argued that depression is not directly related to
low rates of reinforcement but instead to cognitive processes which
mediate between the activity and the cognitive symptomology (Rush,
Khatami, & Beck, 1975).

It could also be that depressives do not attend

to or remember pleasant events and are minimally affected by their occurrence.

These possibilities will be studied in a later section.
A second theoretical perspective which strongly weighs the envir-

onmental component in depression is exemplified by Ferster (1966, 1973,
1974).

Ferster's conceptual position on depression appears to be a

link between the environmentally and cognitively oriented theories.
Coming from a radical behaviorist persuasion, Ferster studied both
descriptive and functional aspects of depression.

The description of

depressive disorders is seen as consisting of both behavioral deficits
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and excesses.
activities.

Deficits are defined as a reduced frequency of normal
"Frequency reduction" refers to rate and quantity alter-

ations as well as occurrence and nonoccurrence of certain behaviors.
Behavioral excesses are related to deficit conditions, for instance when
a compulsive activity appears when normal problem solving behaviors
are no longer emitted.
Functionally, depression is assumed to be related to loss of
important discriminative stimuli, certain reinforcement schedules,
aversive environmental influences, and cognitive distortions.

More

specifically, Ferster contends that depression is apt to be precipitated
by the loss of a source of reinforcement or stimuli leading one to emit
positive behaviors (death of a spouse, loss of a friend, moving to
another city, change of job, etc.).

Lazarus (1968) suggested that the

outcome of such a loss is related to the individual's overall availability of reinforcers.
Ferster also saw certain intermittent schedules of reinforcement
as precipitants of depressive reactions.

From animal studies, certain

fixed schedules of reinforcement providing small gains for a large behavioral expenditure results in a lower rate of responding.

The lowest

rate of behavior is seen immediately after reinforcement is administered.
Depressed individuals often spend a great deal of effort in avoiding being punished by decreasing engagement in aversive behaviors.
Ferster (1973) suggests that this decreased behavior leads to further
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depression since "it commits such a large part of a person's repertoire
to activities that do not produce positive reinforcement" (p. 867).
Ferster (1973, 1974) goes beyond a strict stimulus-response explanation of depression, however, to suggest that the individual's
perception of the world affects his receiving of reinforcement.

More

specifically, he speculates that the depressive has a limited view of
the world and has difficulty discriminating among different environmental stimuli.

Because of these discrimination difficulties, the

depressive is apt to emit a response inappropriate to the situation and
be punished.

An example might be that a depressive considers home,

work, and a party all appropriate places to engage in depressive behaviors.

People at a gala party may consider his behavior strange,

avoid the individual, and shut off another source of reinforcement.
Only partially recognizing that punishment is contingent on the inappropriate behavior, the depressive acquires a "lousy view of the world"
(Ferster, 1973, 1974).

The environment is thought of as providing

limited support, pleasure, and much distress and unhappiness.
In summary, both Lewinsohn and Ferster espouse behavioral theories
of depression.

Ferster's approach has to a greater extent than Lewin-

sohn's attempted to relate depression to both cognitive and environmental
parameters.

He suggests that a one-to-one relationship between environ-

mental stimuli and depressive response does not exist and one must take
into account the non-observable cognitive processes which mediate.
Cognitive-Behavioral Perspective.

On the basis of small animal
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analogue research, Seligman and his colleagues have developed a cognitive model of reactive depression in humans.

The major construct

utilized by this group is called "learned helplessness."

Learned help-

lessness views depression as resulting from cognitions of responseoutcome independence, that is, beliefs that consequences are independent of behavior.
Recently, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) reformulated
the learned helplessness model of depression.

The reformulation recog-

nizes the importance of attributions in predicting reactions to uncontrollable outcomes.

Attributions, i.e., explanations for events, may

be stable or unstable, global or specific, and internal or external
attributions of cause.

The type of attribution chosen influences

whether the future helplessness will be chronic or acute, broad or
narrow, and whether helplessness will lower self-esteem or not.

Selig-

man further stated that individual differences in attributional style
probably exist and those who typically attribute failure to global,
stable and internal factors are most prone to general and chronic
helplessness depressions with low self-esteem.
Two pieces of research are particularly relevant in highlighting
the role of cognitive factors in the development of learned helplessness
patterns of behaviors.

Hirota and Seligman (1975) found that uncontrol-

lable experiences on a motoric task adversely affected performance on a
cognitive task and vice-versa.

The transfer of learned helplessness

experiences is seen as providing support for cognitions concerning
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response-reinforcement independence.

Additional support for the cogni-

tive interpretation comes from research directly manipulating the
instructional set {Hirota, 1974; Miller & Seligman, 1973, 1975).

In

particular, performance on a task was found to vary according to
whether a subject was informed that the outcome is related to chance or
skill.

Similar effects are found for a chance instructional set and an

actual helplessness experience (Hirota, 1974).
as support of mediating cognitions.

Again, these are taken

In the instructional set paradigm

the subject is "given" the cognitive pattern while in the actual
learned helplessness situation the cognition is "learned" or "created"
by the subject.
Additional research has shown that the cognitive changes produced
in learned helplessness experiences are accompanied by a host of behavioral response patterns.

First, helpless subjects behave less

aggressively and less competitively than non-helpless subjects (Maier,
Anderson, & Liberman, 1972; Powell & Creer, 1969).

Passivity andre-

tarded associativity are more prominent after time (Overmier, 1968;
Overmier & Seligman, 1967).

Also, uncontrollable traumatic experiences

are thought to precipitate some physical and physiological dysfunctions.
Weight loss, anorexia and norephineprine depletion have all been cited
(Miller & Weiss, 1969; Weiss, 1968; Weiss, Stone, & Harrell, 1970).
Seligman draws parallels between learned helplessness and depression in areas of etiology and symptomology.

Symptomatically, Seligman

(1974) only draws parallels to reactive depressions consisting of:
passivity, negative expectations, lack of aggression, dissipation in
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time, and also parallels weight loss, anorexia, and norephinephrine
depletion.

The etiology of a depressive episode is like learned help-

lessness in that it is highlighted by the uncontrollability of reinforcement (Teasdale, 1978).
man, 1974,1975).

The cognitions need not be accurate (Selig-

Aging, death of a loved one, and loss of a job are

considered precipitants of depression in that they limit one's control
over the environment or lead one to believe that control does not exist.
Seligman has also addressed the issues of prevention and treatment
of learned helplessness.

In the past, treatment was seen as exposing

the helpless subject to situations'in which the outcome is controllable
(Klein & Seligman, 1976; Seligman, Maier, & Geer, 1968; Seligman, Rosellini & Kozak, 1975).

Prevention, on the other hand, was seen as a his-

tory of reinforcement contingent upon one's actions (Seligman, 1975;
Seligman & Groves, 1970; Seligman & Maier, 1967).

So, the prevention

and antidote of helplessness seemed to be the demonstrated helpfulness
of one's actions.

As

a result of the reformulation, researchers pre-

sently suggest a variety of prevention and treatment suggestions.
Therapists can aid depressed individuals by helping them to change the
estimated probability of aversive outcome, to change the expectation
from uncontrollability to controllability, or to change their attributions for success or failure.

Abramson et al. (1978) have suggested

specific ways these suggestions can be implemented.
For Seligman the goal is the development of personal "competency"
cognitions.

Individuals must believe they are generally able to control
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their environment.

Klein and Seligman (1976) reported that success on

a simple discrimination problem had a therapeutic effect on depressed
subjects' performance and beliefs of control.

Response-contingent

reinforcement is expected to help prevent depression (Seligman, 1974,
1975).
In summary, Seligman has developed a theory of depression supported by extensive research.

He has argued that while environmental

factors cause the emission of depressive behaviors, they are mediated
and probably secondary to the influence of cognitive factors.

An

interesting question arises here, especially for those subjects with
the attributional style that typically attributes failure to global,
stable, and internal factors.

Why do depressives with this attribu-

tional style not concentrate on their positive control experiences?
Perhaps their depressive moods tend to cause them to associate to other
depressive situations.

It is also possible that their recall of positive

contingent reinforcement situations is poor.
Cognitive Perspectives.

One of the most well-known exponents of

the cognitive view is Beck (1967, 1970, 1974).

Beck argues that de-

pression should not be conceptualized as an affective disorder;
rather, as a cognitive disorder.

but

The primary symptom of depression is

the cognitive triad which refers to an organized system of negative
evaluations of oneself, one's future, and the environment.

Low self-

esteem, thoughts of incompetency and inadequacy, poor body image,
thoughts of impending distress, and perceptions of environmental hurdles
were all examples of the depressive's cognitive set.

Behavioral and
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affective symptoms are seen as consequences to the depressed cognitions.
Research conducted by Beck has been twofold.

The development of a

self-report ·test of depression (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock,

&

Erbaugh,

1961) and a helplessness scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler,
1974) were the first focus of attention.

In addition, Beck has

attempted to support his contention that depressives have a negative
view of themselves, their future and their environment.

Research has

shown that depressives dream significantly more about themes of deprivation, rejection, depreciation, self-injury, distorted body image,
etc., than do nondepressives (Beck & Hurvick, 1959; Beck & Ward,. 1961).
Similarly, depressives' earliest recollections have more themes of
rejection than those of nondepressives (Beck & Ward, 1961).

Depressed •

individuals are more likely to identify with a pictorial character who
has had an unpleasant experience than a character who has avoided such
an experience or had a pleasant experience (Beck, 1967).

Beck (1972)

also reports that depressives are apt to down-grade their positive
attributes when asked to compare them with their peers.

Finally, de-

pressed subjects exhibited weaker self-reference recall than normals
suggesting they may describe themselves inconsistently (Davis, 1979).
All these studies support Beck's contention that depressives have a
negative view of themselves, their future, and their environment.
Davis' study (1979) may additionally suggest differential recall between
depressives and normals.
In summary, Beck has developed a theory of depression which clearly emphasizes the role played by cognitive factors and deemphasizes the
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relative importance of environmental parameters.

An important part of

Beck's research seems to be the distinction between the nominal and
the actual antecedent to depressive behavior.

In essence, cognitions

about rather than physical stimuli often determine the course of one's
behavior.

Rehm and coworkers have developed another cognitive theory of
depression which is based on a modified version of Kanfer's self-control
model (Kanfer, 1970a, 1970b, 1971; Kanfer & Karoly, 1972).

Although

this model has been used as a method for achieving behavioral change,
in this context it will aid in explaining the occurrence of a variety
of depressive symptoms.

In particular, depressive behaviors are seen

as arising from maladaptive self-control patterns.

Kanfer has argued

that behavior is maintained and altered by subject mediated regulatory
processes as well as the environment.
basic sequentially ordered operations:
and self-reinforcement.

Self-regulation consists of three
self-monitoring, self-evaluation,

Each of these will be described and its rela-

tionship to depression presented.
The first component of Kaufer's model involves self-monitoring.
Both internal and external stimulus and response events can be monitored.
Motoric responses such as running, studying, hair pulling, etc., all fall
into this category.

Covert responses such as thoughts, imagery, and

sensations like auditory hallucinations (Rutner & Bugle, 1969), obsessional thoughts (Mahoney, 1974), and critical self statements (Hannum,
Thoreson, & Hubbard, 1974) can be monitored.
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In relating self-monitoring processes to depression, a high frequency of negative verbalizations and a low frequency of potentially
enjoyable behaviors can be suggested.
sives· have two such deficits.
than positive events.

Rehm (1977) argues that depres-

First, they attend to negative rather

Second, depressives are thought to give their

attention to immediate effects of their behavior rather than to its
long-term consequences.
With regard to the first notion, Beck (1972) has proposed a similar mechanism to account for cognitive distortions, namely that depressed individuals are seen as selectively abstracting the unpleasant
aspects of their experiences.
support for this concept.

A number of studies provide suggestive

Pluchtick, Platman, and Fieve (1970) have

examined the relationship between depression, ideal self-concept, and
actual self-concept.

Depression was found to correlate with negative

actual self-concept rather than an altered ideal self-concept.

One might

speculate that this is a result of selective attention and memory from
actual positive events toward actual negative events.

Roth (1977) re-

searched this hypothesis and although he did not find support for
differential memory of positive and negative adjectives, he did find
evidence of differential selective attention.

Relative to nondepres-

sives, depressed subjects monitored significantly more of their own
negative and significantly fewer positive behaviors.

Furthermore, it

was postulated that procedural parameters may have precluded the demonstration of recall differences.
Cognitive distortions seen in depressives' self-monitoring may
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occur because depressives "expect the worst."

Friedman (1964) reported

that while depressives and nondepressives performed equally well on a
number of tasks, the depressive expected to do worse.

Similarly, Miller

and Seligman (1973), Klein and Seligman (1976), and Guza (1979) found
that depressed persons had lower expectancies of success than nondepressed persons on laboratory tasks.

Beck (1972) also suggested that

depressives are likely to entertain negative future oriented cognitions.
With this research supporting such negative

self~onitoring

it is easy

to imagine why depressives may not look at the long-term consequences
of their behavior.

Some studies suggest that when they do look at

longer range consequences, depressives then ruminate about the delayed
detrimental effects of their behavior (Beck, 1972; Schless, Schwartz,
Goetz, & Mendels, 1974; Seligman, 1975).
The second component of Kanfer's model is the self-evaluatory
process.
ion.

Monitored responses are evaluated against an internal criter-

Performance may fall above or below this standard.

hypothesizes two maladaptive patterns of self-evaluation.

Rehm (1977)
First, de-

pressed individuals often make inaccurate attributions of causality.
Second, the depressive is likely to have stringent evaluative criteria.
With regard to attribution, Rehm argues that depressives ascribe
negative events to internal factors and positive events to external
factors.

For instance, a bad performance on a task would be due to

personal inability while a good performance on the same task due to
luck.

Miller and Seligman (1973) arguing for the independence of re-

sponding and reinforcement, reported that depressives had lower
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expectancies regarding the likelihood of future successes after behaving
successfully than did nondepressives.

The same finding has been repli-

cated in two other studies (Klein & Seligman, 1976; Miller & Seligman,
1975).

One might infer the subjects attributed their success to exter-

nal factors.

In addition to research support for external attributions,

Guza (1979) reported the depressives were more likely to make attributions in an internal direction following feedback of failure at a task.
Rehm (1977) also proposed that depressives employ a stringent
self-evaluative criteria.

Rehm states the evaluative criteria for de-

pressed people may be characterized by a high threshold for "excellence"
and a low threshold for "failure."

Similar notions have been offered

by behavioral theorists (Bandura, 1971; Marston, 1965) and neo-analytic
theorists (Melges & Bowlby, 1969).

Common to all these perspectives

is the theme that the depressed person has unreachable and unrealistic
goals and standards.

Investigations (Golin & Terrell, Note 7; Murdock-

Kitt, Note 8) have substantiated that depressed students tend to set
higher goal levels than did nondepressed students.

In addition, thera-

pists have reported anecdotally that depressed patients may employ
overly high criteria to evaluate their behavior (Bandura, 1971).

All

in all, studies support the hypothesis of depressed subjects having
stringent self-evaluations.
Some of the self-evaluation research suggests a differential
recall component contributing to the stringent self-evaluations of depressives.

DeMonbreun and Craighead (1977) and Nelson and Craighead

(1977) reported depressed subjects recalled less positive and more
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negative feedback than controls at high levels of reinforcement.

Nel-

son et al. (1977) also reported that depressed subjects accurately
recalled negative reinforcement while normals underestimated the same.
These studies suggest that emotional state may be related to the content of an individual's recall, specifically mood may be related to
recall of mood-congruous material.
The final stage of the self-control chain involves self-reinforcement. ·Contingent self-reward and self-punishment enables an
individual to increase or decrease certain response patterns.

The

effect of self-reinforcement on associated behaviors has been extensively
reviewed by Thoreson and Mahoney (1974) and Mahoney and Thoreson (1974).
Rehm (1977) postulates that depression is characterized by high rates
of self-punishment and low rates of self-reward.
Support for the contention that depression is associated with
maladaptive self-reinforcement is obtained from three studies.

When

subjects were told to reward themselves if they thought they were correct, not reinforce themselves when they were unsure of their responses,
or punish themselves if they thought they were incorrect, Rozensky,
Rehm, Pry, and Roth (Note 9) found that depressed patients administered
more self-punishments and fewer rewards than nondepressed patients or
normal control patients.
actual correct responses.

The groups did not differ with regard to
Roth, Rehm, and Rozensky (Note 10), who par-

tially replicated this study, found that depressed college students
emitted significantly more self-punishments than nondepressed college
students.

Nelson and Craighead (1977) also report depressed subjects
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self-reinforcing less than controls but did not find different rates
of self-punishment.

In general, studies support that reinforcement

is related to more stringent requirements in depressed individuals.
Behavioral passivity is often cited as a core symptom of depression.

Many behaviorists argue that retarded movements, infrequent

participation in previously reinforcing activities, etc. are related
to a lack of external reinforcement (Ferster, 1974; Lazarus, 1968;
Lewinsohn, 1974).

Self-control literature suggests that self-adminis-

tered and externally administered reinforcements are equally able to
maintain behavior patterns (Roth, 1977).
Summary.

Five theories of depression were described.

All these

theories of depression implicated cognition in some manner.

Lewinsohn

and Ferster suggest that the role of cognition in depression, if it
exists at all, is merely a symptom resulting from environmental influences.

Seligman proposes that cognition plays a more important role in

depression.

A cognition of learned helplessness, as a result of re-

sponse-outcome inconsistency, becomes a mind-set through which future
behaviors are affected.
Beck and Rehm are the strongest advocates of the cognitive determinant in depressive behavior.

Both theorists suggest that cognitions

are central to depression rather than merely symptoms of depression.
Beck's main premise states that cognitions about stimuli rather than the
physical stimuli determine the course of an individual's behavior.
has developed a theory in which depressives' self-monitoring,

Rehm
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self-evaluation, and self-reinforcement differ from normals.

Research

suggests that self-evaluation and possibly self-monitoring may be
affected by differential recall.
Bower's Research on Cognition and Emotion
Recently, Bower, a cognitive psychologist, presented several
studies concerning the relationship between mood and cognitive processes (1981).

Bower's work adds supporting data and a somewhat dif-

ferent perspective to the previously discussed cognitive theories of
depression.

Whereas cognitive theories view affect as resulting from

cognitions, Bower introduced affect to aid in understanding memory and
cognition.
Theoretically, Bower approaches the relationship between depression and cognitive processes from a strong cognitive perspective.
Still the importance of emotions playing a causal role in behavior is
illustrated by his associative network theory of emotional behavior.
"In this theory, emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into
associations with coincident events.

Activation of this emotion unit

aids in retrieval of events associated with it • . • " (p. 129).

An

emotion can also prime themes for other cognitive processes such as free
associations, interpretation of ambiguous material, perceptual organizations, etc.
Three major areas of study have been focused on by Bower.

In all

cases, research has primarily been done on subjects in which happy or
sad moods have been induced hypnotically.

One area of study concerns
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mood-state-dependent memory.

In a representative study (Bower, 1981),

subjects learned two lists of words, one while happy and one while sad.
Then they were asked to free recall the original list while either in
the same or opposite mood.

Controls who learned both lists and free

recalled all in the same mood were also included.

Compared to the

controls, state-dependency appeared in better recall in the same-mood
list and worse recall in the opposite-mood list.

Emotional mood was

a helpful feature in distinguishing target material from interferring
material.

State-dependent effects were also found in subjects remember-

ing personal and childhood experiences.

That is, people remembered a

greater percent of experiences that were affectively congruent to the
mood they were in during recall.
A second area researched by Bower is that of emotion's powerful
influences on cognitive processes such as free associations, fantasies,
social perceptions and snap judgments about others.

For example, Bower

(1981) demonstrated that mood significantly influenced the interpretation of ambiguous scenes from TAT cards.

This finding is consistent with

the research of Roth and Rehm (1980) demonstrating that mood biased categories areused in interpreting ambiguous interpersonal scenes.

Clin-

ically depressed subjects rated their interview behavior as having
significantly more negative and unskilled behaviors than nondepressed
subjects.

This also agrees with Rehm's (1977) hypothesis that depres-

sives self-monitor their own behaviors more negatively than nondepressives.

Bower, Forgas, and Krantz (cited in Bower, 1981) partially

replicated this experiment on college students hypnotized to feel either
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socially competent or incompetent.

Students feeling socially incompe-

tent rated their behaviors more negatively than students hypnotized to
feel socially competent.
People's moods also had powerful effects on free associations they
gave to neutral words (Bower, 1981).

Hypnotized subjects generated

chained associates to five words when they were happy and to another
five words when they were angry.

The criterion used to determine

whether the associations were influenced by mood was the judges' ability
to correctly differentiate the affective state of the individual who
made the associations.

When blind judges evaluated whether the chain

showed "happiness" or "anger" or "can't decide," they judged anger
accurately 83% of the time and happiness 73% of the time, significant
at the .01 level.

Fisher and Marrow (1934) used hypnosis-induced moods

and Madigan and Ballenbach (Note 11) used moods induced by the Velton
procedure with much the same results.
The associative network theory also implies mood affects snap
judgments of people or objects.

Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978)

found subjects gave more positive ratings on mock consumer surveys when
they were feeling good after receiving a gift.

Bower (1981) found sub-

jects' thumbnail sketches of others were affected by their happy or
angry moods.

It is suggested that current mood activates and primes

mood-congruent categories into readiness and these are used to assimilate and classify ambiguous experiences.
The third area of study which Bower reviewed and researched is
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that of salience of mood-congruous material.

That is, people attend to

and remember information which is emotionally salient to their mood.
Bower gave two examples of subjects showing lower recognition thresholds for emotionally salient material.

Clore (cited in Bower, 1981)

found that happy and angry subjects responded quicker and with fewer
errors to mood-salient material.

Postman and Brown (1952) reported

lower recognition thresholds (less bright exposures needed) for
successes-versus-failure words for subjects who had just experienced
success or failure in an unrelated task.
Research also shows evidence of mood-salient memory.

In one ex-

periment (Bower, Gilligan,.& Monteiro, 1981), subjects were made happy
or sad by post-hypnotic suggestion and read a balanced third person
account of two people, one who was happy--everything was going well,
and one who was sad--everything was going wrong.

Subjects were found

to identify with the mood-salient character and reported that this
character was the central one in the story.

The next day while in a

neutral mood subjects recalled more facts about the character who
exhibited the same mood they had felt the day before.

Because they

were in a neutral mood at the time of recall, this was a mood-congruous
learning effect.

In another experiment (Bower et al., 1981) subjects

were induced to feel happy or sad by post-hypnotic suggestions and read
about one character who related an unrelated series of happy or sad
incidents.

Subjects reportedly remember more incidents related with

their mood.

Happy readers recalled one and one half as many happy

incidents as sad incidents and sad readers recalled one and one third
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as many sad as happy incidents.

So, the mood contiguity effects seem

to affect learning or memory.
In summary, Bower has investigated the effects of mood and cognitive process in terms of a network theory.

Using primarily hypno-

tized subjects, Bower reported three major findings.

First, he

reported a strong mood-state-dependent effect on memory.

Secondly, he

suggested that emotions affect cognitive processes such as free association by assimilating and categorizing mood congruent categories into
readiness.

Lastly, Bower reported evidence in which learning or memory

for mood-congruous material is higher than for mood-discordant material.
Bower's findings have.strong implications for the cognitive
theories of depression.

Bower's approach agrees with their basic

premise that cognitions are central to depression.

In addition, this

research extends cognitive models of depression by investigating the
relationship between emotions and cognitive processes to further the
understanding of how cognitions influence behavior.

Specifically,

Bower suggests that emotions have powerful influences on memory, associations, fantasies, social perceptions, snap judgments, and salience
of mood congruous material.

Differences in these cognitive processes,

in turn, show up in differences in the behavior of depressed individuals.
In sum, Bower's research has added supporting data and somewhat different perspective to the previously discussed cognitive theories of
depression.
Two questions arise from this research.

The first is one that
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Bower has

raised~

findings?

that is, do demand characteristLcs play a role in the

Bower (1981) reports a series of experiments (Bower & Vallone,

cited in Bower, 1981; Stanislavski, 1936; Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979)
which attempt to distinguish between automatic versus demand compliance
interpretations of the data.

Specifically, are the emotions evoked by

hypnotism real and if they are, were the subjects responding naturally
to the stimuli or were they responding to please the experimenter?
Although research attempting to control for demand characteristics
suggests that they do not play a role in the results, further research
in which demand characteristics are not involved is suggested.
question concerns the generalizability of Bower's results.

A second

Although the

expected results are obtained by using experimentally induced moods,
would naturally occurring moods found in the "real" world still have
discernible effects on cognitive processes?

To determine whether

Bower's findings have relevance for understanding and treating depression in clinical settings, research with subjects showing varying
degress of naturally-occurring depression is necessary.
Gundersen (Note 1) extended the generalizability of Bower's
findings by using subjects with varying degrees of naturally occurring
depression.

Specifically, Gundersen tested the affective recall of

normal college subjects who varied on two tests measuring levels of
depression.

The recall of subjects who measured high (very depressed)

on both the Beck Depression Inventory and the Multiscore Depression
Inventory was compared to the recall of subjects who measured low on
both inventories.

When the ten subjects on each extreme were compared

33

significant differences in recall were found.

Depressed subjects re-

membered more depressed words than happy subjects.

No differences in

amount of recall, ordering of recall, interjections into recall, or
content of recall were found when all the subjects in both categories
were used.

It was hypothesized that college subjects did not vary

enough in their levels of depression.

Further testing of recall with

clinically depressed and euphoric subjects is still necessary to add
further data supporting Bower's premise relating cognition and emotion.
The purpose of the present study was to replicate the Gundersen
research using clinically depressed and euphoric subjects.

Also, a

partial replication of Bower et al. (1981) research in which subjects
recalled happy, sad, and neutral incidents from a narrative, was done.
Since the project used patients that were actually clinically depressed
or euphoric instead of subjects hypnotized to be happy or sad, the
generalizability of Bower's findings was studied.

HYPOTHESES
1.

Affect of the subjects will be related to the affective content of
what is recalled.
a. Depressed subjects will remember more sad than happy words
from the list and more sad than happy events from the story.
b. Manic subjects will remember more happy than sad words from
the list and more happy than sad incidents from the story.

2.

Mood will be related to subjects' ratings of the affect of words.
a. Depressed subjects will rate the affect of words as sadder.
b. Manic subjects will rate the affect of words as happier.

3.

Mood will be related to the total number of words or incidents
recalled.
a. Depressed subjects will recall less total number of words
and less total incidents than manic subjects.

4.

Mood will be related to motivation in recall.
a. Depressed subjects will recall more words than manic subjects
after the experimenter prompts by asking if they wish to
have more time for recall.

5.

Mood will be related to whether words a!e interjected into recall.
a. Manic subjects will interject more words or incidents than
depressed subjects.
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6.

Mood will be related to the nature of the words or incidents
interjected.
a. Depressed subjects will interject more sad words or incidents.
b. Manic subjects will interject more happy words or incidents.

7.

Mood will be related to the order of recall.
a. Depressed subjects will remember sad words generally before
the happy or neutral words.
b. Manic subjects will rem.em ber the happy words generally before
the neutral or sad words.

8.

Mood will be related to the nature of the chain associations to
neutral words.
a. Depressed subjects will chain associate more depressively to
neutral words.·
b. Manic subjects will chain associate more positively to neutral
words.

METHOD
Subjects
The subjects in this study were 40 patients taken from the acute
psychiatry units of North Chicago Veteran's Administration Medical
Center.

They were divided into two groups based on their clinical

diagnosis by the staff psychologist and their score on the Beck Depression Inventory.

In order to be categorized as depressed, patients met

the requirements for Major Depressive Episode or Dysthymic Disorder set
forth in the Diagnostic Criteria from the DSM III.
tic criteria included were:

Some of the diagnos-

poor appetite or significant weight loss,

insomnia or hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, loss
of energy, feelings of worthlessness or self-reproach, recurrent
thoughts of death, etc.

Patients placed in the depressed category also

had a BDI score of 12 or above.

To be categorized as manic for this

research, the patients met the requirements for Xanic Episode set forth
in the Diagnostic criteria from DSM III.
teria included were:

Some of the diagnostic cri-

increased activity, more talkative than usual,

inflated self-esteem (grandiosity), decreased need for sleep, etc.
Patients in the manic group all must have a score of less than 12 on
the BDl.

For both depressed and manic groups, no patient who was also

exhibiting psychotic features was included.
Materials
Beck Depression Inventory.

Subjects were given the Beck
36
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Depression Inventory (BDI:
. 1961).

Beck, Ward, Mendelson, }bck, & Erbaugh,

The BDI is comprised of 21 items, each of which represents a

discrete depressive symptom.

Each item includes graded statements

pertaining to the severity of the symptom.

The examinees endorse the

statement best matching their behavioral or-experimental state.

An

evaluation of the internal consistency of the BDI (Beck, 1967) resulted
in a split-half reliability of .86 using the Pearson.£;
man Brown correction, this rose to • 93.

with a Spear-

The traditional test-retest

method of assessing stability and consistency were not considered
appropriate because the memory factor might inflate the score;

however,

an indirect method of estimating the stability of the instrument found
that changes in the score of the inventory paralleled changes in clinical ratings (made by psychiatrists) indicating a "consistent relationship of the instruments to the patient's clinical state". (Beck, 196 7,
p. 195).

A concurrent validity of .75 was found in a. correlation

between the BDI and the MMPI-D scale.

Also, a validity score of .66

was obtained between the BDI and the Depression Adjective Check List.
Further measures of internal consistency, concurrent validity, and
construct validity are available in Beck (1967).
Stimulus Words.

For the recall portion of this project a list of

21 words (7 happy, 7 neutral, 7 sad) was used.

The final lists were

derived from a group of 100 adjectives which have been rated for their
affective content.

A group of 101 undergraduate psychology students

rated the content of the adjectives as being:
Happy, Very Happy, or Not Applicable.

Very Sad, Sad, Neutral,

Words were divided into
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affective categories according to their ratings.

Words which were

described as either Sad or Very Sad at least 85% of the time were put
in the Sad category;

words which were rated as Neutral in their affec-

tive content at least 85% of the time were put into the Neutral category;

and words that were rated as Happy or Very Happy at least 85%

of the time were put in the Happy category.

Next, 7 words from each

category were matched for frequency of use (Kucera & Francis, 1967) and
put together to form the list of 21 words.

For purposes of this study

each word was printed on a 3" x 8" card in black magic marker and
placed in random order.

The list contains the following words:

Miser-

able, Lucky, Steady, Destroyed, Tame, Thoughtful, Failure, Optimistic,
Jovial, Tormented, Cheerful, Impartial, Mild, Neutral, Lively, Morbid,
Discouraged, Energetic, Usual, Suffering, and Interested.
explains which words were placed in each category.

Table 1

The experimenter

recorded the number and order of the words recalled.
For the association part of the experiment, 5 neutral words have
been selected on the basis of their face validity.
Experience, Idea, Music, and Function.
ate 4" x 9" sheets of paper.

The words are:

The words were placed on separ-

Each sheet had one word at the top and

five lines below it where the associations were written.

The five

sheets for each subject will be stapled together with a cover sheet
containing directions on the front.
Story.

Life,

All the patients read a 660-word fictitious narrative

that described four sessions involving a male patient (Paul Smith,
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TABLE 1
Recall Words Divided According to Affect
Happy Words

Neutral Words

Sad Words

Lucky

Steady

Miserable

Optimistic

Tame

Destroyed

Jovial

Thoughtful

Failure

Cheerful

Impartial

Tormented

Lively

Mild

Morbid

Energetic

Neutral

Discouraged

Interested

Usual

Suffering
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fictitious name) undergoing hypnotherapy with a psychiatrist.

Except

for brief statements giving the setting and describing the beginning
and ending of the sessions, the narrative mainly depicts Paul recalling
'and relating a carefully balanced variety of happy, neutral, and sad
incidents from his life.

The narrative was identical to the one used

by Bower, Gilligan and Monteiro (1981) and is reproduced in Appendix A.
It has been divided into 78 basic idea units which are further divided
into 26 happy incidents, 26 neutral incidents, and 26 sad incidents.
Examples of happy items are memories of riding piggyback on his
father's back, being accepted at college, and attending holiday family
gatherings, etc.

Sad memories include the deaths of his grandfather

and his dog, being cut from the baseball squad, and his sister's
injuries in a car accident.

Neutral items usually pertain to the

setting information, the beginning of the trance or the ending of a
trance at each session, and remarks between the doctor and Paul about
his progress.
Procedure
Each subject was seen for approximately 45 minutes.

Subjects were

told that the experiment was studying "the effect of certain personality
characteristics on cognitive processes."

Secondly, subjects were given

a consent form to read and sign (see Appendix B).

Any questions were

answered.

The subjects were then asked to fill out a Beck Depression

Inventory.

Next, they were given the word association packet which

had the following directions:

"On each of the following pages, look

at the typed word and write the first five words that word brings to

41
mind."

After the subjects were finished with the word associations,

they were instructed:
Next, I am going to show you 21 words, one at a time. When I
finish, I would like to see how many words you can remember.
Just recall as many as you can and I'll mark them down on
this paper. No one can remember them all, just recall as many
as you can. Any questions? Ready?
Each word was shown and verbalized to the subject one at a time at twosecond intervals.

After the entire list was read and shown to the sub-

jects, they were asked to verbally recall as many as possible.

After

the subjects recalled as many as they could initially, the experimenter
asked if they wished to have more time.
were also recorded.

Any additional words remembered

When the task was completed, the subjects were

allowed to look at the experimenter's list on which their responses
were recorded.

For the last task, subjects were given a copy of the

narrative story and told, "Next I'm going to have you read this short
story.

Please read it very carefully because I am going to ask you to

recall as much as you can about it when you are through.

Ready?"

After the story was read, subjects were asked to verbally recall as
many details as possible while the experimenter wrote them down.

RESULTS
This study was designed to examine the relationship between
affect and two cognitive processes, immediate recall and associations.
A portion of the study was a replication of Bower, Gilligan, and MOnteiro's work (recalling events from a short story) using a clinical
population.

Specifically, eight major hypotheses were examined.

involved the relationship between:
recall;

They

mood and the affective content of

mood and ratings of affective stimuli;

affect and the total

amount of recall including the role of motivation in recall;

affect

and the number and affective content of interjected stimuli;

affect

and the order of recall;

and affect and associations to neutral words.

The results are organized and presented as they apply to each hypothesis.
Mood and Affective Content of Recall
Words.

Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of

happy, neutral, and sad words remembered by all 40 of the manic and
depressed subjects.
the hypothesis.

An orderly visual trend is seen in the direction of

That is, manic subjects recalled an average of 2.50

happy words and only 1.15 sad words.

On the other hand, depressed

subjects remembered only 1.30 happy words and 2.55 sad words.

At both

levels of mood, neutral words were remembered at lower rates than happy
or sad words (manic= .50 words and depressed= .40 words).

Not only

does there appear to be an orderly progression within each level of
42

43

TABLE 2

The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral,
and Sad Words Recalled for 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects

Words Recalled
GROUP

Happy

Neutral

Sad

Manic

2.50 (1.43)

.50 (. 61)

1.15 ( • 6 7)

4.15 (1.46)

Depressed

l. 30 ( .92)

.40 (. 82)

2.55 ( • 95)

4.25 (1. 82)

Average Words
Recalled

1.90 (1.34)

.45 (. 71)

1.85 (1. 08)

4.20 (1.52)

Note.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Total
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mood, there also appears to be expected results between each level of
mood.

That is, happy words seemed to be remembered on the average more

often by manic subjects than depressed subjects (2.50 and 1.30, respectively) and sad words seem to be recalled on the average more often by
depressed subjects than manic subjects (2.55 and 1.15, respectively).
A visual summary of these results is presented in Figure 1.
Several analyses were done to determine the statistical significance of the visual trend.

A multivariate analysis for repeated

measures showed there was a statistically significant difference due to
the interaction between the affect of a subject (manic versus depressed)

I

and the affect of the words recalled (happy or sad), Approx. Mult.

= 17.595, £

(2,37)

< .0005.

Planned univariate contrasts demonstrated

that manics on the average recalled significantly more happy than sad
words (2.50 and 1.15 words, respectively), !(1,76)

= 19.675, £

<.0005,

and depressives recalled on the average significantly more sad than
happy words (2.55 and 1.30 words, respectively), f(l,76)
.0005.

= 16.868,

£ <

There was also a multivariate statistically significant differ-

ence due to the affect of the words recalled, Approx. Mult. f(2,37)
40.505,

£ <.0005.

=

Specifically, multivariate contrasts of the average

number of words recalled by affect across groups showed that neutral
words were remembered significantly less often than happy or sad words,
t

= -5.45582,

£ <.0005.

In sum, mood was significantly related to the affect of words
recalled.

Depressives remembered more sad than happy words while manics
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Note. Striped bar is manic group; block bar is depressed group.

Figure 1.

Comparing the Affective Content and Total Recall
(for Words) of a Group of 20 Manic Subjects With
the Recall of a Group of 20 Depressed .Subjects
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recalled more happy than sad words.

On the whole, neutral words were

remembered less often than either happy or sad words across groups.
Events.

Table 3 presents the mean number of happy, neutral, and

sad events which subjects recalled from the short story.

Again, an

orderly visual trend is seen in the direction of the hypothesis.

Manic

subjects recalled an average of 2.90 happy events and 2.55 sad events
while depressed subjects remembered on the average only 1.95
events and 3.60 sad events.
gression between mood levels.

happy

There also appears to be an orderly proThat is, happy events seemed to be

remembered on the average more often by manic subjects than depressed
subjects (2.90 events and 1.95 events, respectively) and sad events
seemed to be remembered on the average more often by depressed subjects
than manic subjects (3.60 and 2.55 events, respectively).
~

See Figure

for a visual presentation.
Statistically, multivariate analyses of variance demonstrated there

is a significant interaction of group and affect of events recalled,
Approx. Mult. f(2,37)

= 4.822, £ = .014.

Specifically, planned uni-

variate contrasts showed that depressives remembered significantly more
sad than happy events, f(l,76) = 12.910,

£ = .001; however, contrasts

between the number of happy and sad events recalled by manics was not
significant, f(l,76)

=

.5809,

~·

There was also a significant main

effect for the affect of the events recalled, Approx. Mult. f(2,37)
6.3655,

£ = .004.

=

The multivariate contrast showed that across groups,

the number of neutral events recalled compared to the number of happy
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TABLE 3
The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral,
and Sad Events Recalled for 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects

Events Recalled
Sad
Neutral

Total

GROUP

Happy

Manic

2.90 (1. 86)

2.10 (1. 92)

2.55 (2.72)

7.55 (5.69)

Depressed

1. 95 (2.06)

1. 70 (1.56)

3.60 (2.35)

7.25 (4. 76)

Average Events
Recalled

2.43 (1.99)

1.90 (1.74)

3.08 (2.57)

7.40 (5.18)

Note.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Striped bar is manic group; block bar is depressed group.

Figure 2.

Comparing the Affective Content and Total Recall
(for Events) of a Group of 20 Manic Subjects With
the Recall of a Group of 20 Depressed Subjects
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or sad events was significant,

~

= -3.050,

~

=.004.

In sum, a rela-

tionship between mood and the affect of events recalled was demonstrated.
All in all, the hypothesis suggesting a relationship between mood
and affective content of recall was strongly supported.

Manics remem-

bered significantly more happy words and events than depressives,
while depressives recalled significantly more depressed words and
events than manics.
also demonstrated.

In both subtests, a main effect for affect was
Neutral words and events across groups were on the

average recalled significantly less often than words and events with
extreme affective values.
Mood and Ratings of Stimuli
To control for variability in individual subjects' personal
reactions to the affective content of each stimulus word, the subjects
rated each of the 21 words on a five-point graphic rating scale (a
Likert scale) for affect level.

The subject was assigned a 1 if the

word was rated as "very sad," and 2 if the word was "sad," a 3 if the
word was "neutral," a 4 if the word was "happy," or a 5 if the word
was rated as "very happy."

It was observed that in no case did any

subject assign an affect value which was extremely opposite to the
affect value which was expected.

For example, in no case was a word

which was prerated and assigned to the happy group of words_ rated as
"sad" or "very sad" by an individual.

To observe possible group differ-

ences in affective ratings of stimulus words, each of the 21 ratings
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was summed up to yield a single score for each subject, an overall
rating of the affect of the words.

This overall rating of each sub-

ject was analyzed in a one-way analysis of variance to see if there
was any difference in the overall mean totaled ratings of manics or
depressed subjects.

The manic subjects rated the 21 words with a mean

total score of 64.35 and a standard deviation of 2.72, while the depressed subjects rated the words with a mean total score of 59.80 and
a standard deviation of 4.11.

This difference is statistically signi-

ficant, F(l,38) = 17.036, £ =.0002.

In sum, the manic subjects'

totaled ratings of the stimulus words were more positive than those of
the depressed subjects.
In sum, the hypothesis relating mood to affective ratings of
stimuli was solidly supported.
positively than did depressives.

Manics rated the stimuli generally more
Differences between the groups were

demonstrated by summing up ratings across 21 words to yield a single
totaled score for each subject.
Affect and Total Recall
Words.

Table 2 showed that manic subjects remembered an average

of 4.15 words and depressed subjects remembered an average of 4.25
words.

A multivariate analysis of variance using repeated measures was

conducted to assess the difference in the mean total number of happy,
neutral, and sad words recalled by manic and depressed subjects.

There

was no statistically significant difference between the mean total
number of words recalled by manic subjects and the mean total number of
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words recalled by depressed subjects, !(1,38)

=

.042, ns.

In anticipation of demonstrating differences in the total recall
between manics and depressives, a control for motivation in the form
of a prompt was introduced.

After subjects had initially responded by

recalling as many words as they could, they were encouraged to take as
much time as they needed to recall any more words that may come to
mind.

The number of words recalled after the prompt was recorded for

each subject.

For both manic and depressed groups the mean number of

words recalled after the prompt was identical, .55 with standard deviations of .999 and .887 words, respectively.

No difference in the aver-

age number of words recalled after prompting demonstrated that the two
groups were not

stati~tically

different so no further analysis was

done.
Events.

The results for the total nUmber of events recalled are

similar to those for the total number of words recalled.

Table 3

showed that manic subjects remembered an average of 7.55 events while
depressed subjects recalled an average of 7.25 events.

An analysis of

variance demonstrated there was no significant difference in the mean
total number of events recalled by manic and depressed subjects, !(1,38)

=

.03274, ns.

No prompting measure was recorded for events.

In sum, the hypothesis relating affect to total recall was not
statistically supported in either measure of recall (total words or
total events remembered).

Furthermore, the hypothesis suggesting that

mood would be related to motivation in recall was not supported.

Both

52
manic and depressed groups remembered a small but equal mean number
of words after prompting.
Affect and Interjected Stimuli
Words.

A one-way analysis of variance predicting the number of

words interjected from affect showed no difference in the mean number
of interjected words for manic versus depressed subjects.

The manic

group added on the average 1.05 words while the depressed subjects
added on the average 0.65 words.
significant, !(1,38)

= 1.136,

The difference was not statistically

~·

Table 4 shows the mean number and affect of interjected words for
manic and depressed subjects.

While the numbers are small, there

appears to be a within group effect.

Manic subjects interject on the

average .85 happy words and only on the average .10 sad words, while
depressed subjects interjected an average of only .05 happy words and
.60 sad words.

A between-groups effect also appears evident.

Manics

remember on the average more happy words than depressives (.85 and .05,
respectively), while depressives interject more sad words than manics
(.60 and .10 words, respectively).
visually.

Figure 3 presents these results

Statistically, there was a significant Multivarial F for

groups, Approx. Mult. !(3,36) = 4.656,

£ = .008.

The manic subjects

interjected more happy words than depressed subjects, !(1,76) = 11.676,

£

= .001 and depressed subjects interjected more sad words than manic

subjects, !(1,76)

=

9.811,

£ = .002. The univariate F for neutral words

interjected was not significant, !(1,38) = 2.111,

~·

In sum, although
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TABLE 4

The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral,
and Sad Words Interjected by 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects

Words Added
Happy

Neutral

Sad

Total

Manic

.85 (1. 39)

.10 ( . 31)

.10 ( .31)

1.05 (1.50)

Depressed

.05 ( .22)

0.00 (0.00)

.60 (.75)

.65 ( • 75)

Average Words
Added

• 45 (1. 06)

• 05 ( • 22)

• 35 (. 62)

.85 (1.19)

GROUP

Note.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Striped bar is manic group; block bar is depressed group.

Figure 3.

The Content and Number of Word Interjected Into
the Recall for Two Psychiatric Groups (Each N=20)

55

affect was not related to the amount of words interjected into recall,
affect was related to the affective value of words interjected when the
value was extreme.
Events.

Table 5 shows the mean number of events interjected by

depressed and manic groups.

Very few events were interjected.

The

manic subjects added an average of .40 total events while the depressed
subjects added an average of .05 events.
nificantly different, !(1,38)

= 1.39,

~·

This difference was not sigDue to the fact that the

means in the data were so small and some of the variables had no variance, a statistical analysis to determine the relationship between mood
and affect of events was inappropriate.

A visual trend, however, was

suggestive of a relationship similar to that found previously between
mood and affect of words interjected.
In sum, the hypothesis relating affect to the number of words interjected was not supported.

Neither words interjected into the recall

list nor events interjected into recall of the short story could be
predicted from the mood of the subjects.

On the other hand, there was

support for the hypothesis relating mood and the affect of stimuli
interjected.

Manic subjects interjected significantly more happy than

sad words and depressed subjects interjected more sad than happy words
into the recalled list.

Although a statistical analysis was not done,

a similar visual trend was apparent between subjects' mood and the
affect of events interjected.
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TABLE 5
The Means and Standard Deviations of Happy, Neutral,
and Sad Events Interjected by 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects

Events Added
GROUP

Happy

Manic
Depressed
Average
Events Added
Note.

Neutral

Sad

Total

.3

(0.92)

0.0 (0. 0)

.10 (.31)

.4

0.0

(0. 00)

0.0 (0. 0)

• OS ( .22)

• OS (. 22)

.15 ( .66)

0.0 (0.0)

. 08 (. 27)

• 23 (. 73)

Standard deviations are in parentheses.

(. 99)
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Affect and Order of Recall
To analyze the order of the words remembered, the recalled words
were divided into three groups, the first third of the words recalled,
the second third of the words recalled, and the last third of the
words recalled for each subject.

Sad words were rated as 1, neutral

words were rated as 2, and happy words were rated as 3.

The average

level of affect in each of the three word groups was computed and the
results are shown on Table 6.

A repeated measures multivariate analysis

of variance testing for the order of recall within subjects was not
significant, !(3,38)

=

.03834,

~·

That is, across manic and depressed

subjects, there was no difference in the average affect of words recalled in the first, second, and third groups (1.866, 1.835, and 1.879,
respectively).

Next, a multivariate analysis of variance testing for

the interaction of group by order of recall was done.

There were no

significant interaction effects, Approx. Mult. !(3,36)

= 1.56435,

ns.

In sum, the hypothesis relating mood and the affective order of
recall was not supported.

There were no significant differences in

tests for order of recall across manic and depressed subjects or in
tests for the interaction of group by order of recall.
Affect and Chain Association
To test the hypothesis that mood influences chain associations to
neutral stimuli, a procedure similar to Bower's was used.

Two judges

independently rated the subjects' chain associations as made by either
a manic or depressed person.

The criterion used to determine whether
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TABLE 6
Means and Standard Deviations for Affect Ratings of Three Groups of
Words in the Order Remembered by 20 Manic and 20 Depressed Subjects

GROUP

First

Second

Affect Ratings
Third
Average Total

Manic

2.35 (.71)

2.09 (.93)

2.32 (.92)

2.25 (.85)

Depressed

1.38 (.68)

1.58 (.69)

1.44 (.81)

1.47 (.74)

Average
Group Rating

1.87 (.84)

1.84 (.85)

1.88 (.96)

1.86 (.86)

Note.

Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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the associations were influenced by mood was the judges' ability to
correctly differentiate the affective state of the individual who made
the associations.

Interjudge reliability as determined by their inde-

pendent ratings of sample chain associations was 90%.
izes the judges' ratings of the chain associations.

Table 7 summarThe judges were

accurately able to identify the chain associations of manic subjects
an average of 87.5% of the time and depressed subjects 85% of the time.
A chi square using the obtained and theoretical frequencies was significant, Chi Square (1)

= 10.525, £ <.005.

The judges were rating the

associations at a significantly different from chance level.

Manic

subjects chain associated to neutral words in an observably different
way than depressed s•.1bj ects.
In sum, the hypothesis suggesting a relationship between affective state and chain associations to neutral words was supported.

Manic

and depressed subjects chain associate to neutral words in observably
different ways.
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TABLE 7
Correct Ratings of Chain Word Associations
Into Either Depressed or Manic Groups

Correct Ratings
RATERS

Manic

Depressed

Average

Judge 1

17

17

17

Judge 2

18

17

17.5

Average
Rating

17.5

17

17.25

DISCUSSION
The preceding research was based on the

premi~e

that mood is re-

lated to cognitive processes such as immediate recall and associations.
In general, strong support was shown for several of the hypotheses
associated with this premise.

Specifically, relationships between:

mood and the affective content of recall, mood and the affective content of interjected stimuli, mood and ratings of stimuli, and affect and
associations to neutral words, were demonstrated to be significant.
In cases in which two tests of the hypothesized relationship (word and
event recall tasks) were done, they showed similar results and in no
case were contradictory.

No support was provided for hypotheses regard-

ing the relationship between:

mood and total amount of recall, includ-

ing the role of motivation in recall, mood and the number of words
interjected into recall, and mood and affective order of recall.
These results are consistent with the general premises of cognitive
theories of depression which propose differences in the cognitive processes between depressed and nondepressed individuals.

Beck (1972)

showed that depressed subjects selectively abstract the unpleasant
aspects of their experience which suggests the possibility of selective
memory.

Roth (1977) did not find support for selective memory in sub-

jects but did find evidence of selective attention to mood-congruent
aspects of their own behavior.

Additionally, Rehm (1977) suggested

possible selective memory and attention as reasons for differences in
61
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self-monitoring and self-evaluation between depressed and nondepressed
subjects.

The present study supported the work of these cognitive

theorists by demonstrating mood-congruent recall and associations in
both depressed and manic subjects.
These results are also consistent with Bower's work which showed
differences in cognitive processes relative to subject mood.

Specif-

ically, the data supporting the hypothesis relating mood and affective
content of recall is consistent with Bower's preliminary work (Bower,
1980; Bower, Gilligan, & Monteiro, 1981) using subjects hypnotized to
emulate happy and sad states.

Portions of the present research par-

tially replicated Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro (1981) in which hypnotized subjects read and recalled events from a short story in which the
main character described many unrelated happy and sad incidents in his
life.

In addition to showing a relationship between cognition and

affect consistent with previous research, the present research found
these differences using the extreme mood levels found in a clinical
population of manic and depressed subjects.

Some of the earlier reser-

vations of previous researchers concerning the need to strongly manipulate the subjects' mood to obtain results, the "realness" of the mood
induced, possible demand characteristics resulting from evident mood
inducement, and generalizability of previous lab findings are minimized
by this design.
The present research furthered Bower's preliminary work in a
second way.

This research demonstrated that it was not necessary to
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·use happy and sad events to show cognitive differences in happy and sad
individuals.

Words with affectively laden contents are also effective.

In most cases in which word tests of recall were used in addition to
event tests of recall (specifically affective content of recall, total
recall, amount and type of interjections into recall), the results
were consistent.

In fact, statistical analyses done on the word recall

tasks showed greater degrees of significance than statistical analyses
completed on the event recall tasks.

One discrepancy was noted when

comparing a univariate contrast for the word task with a contrast for
the event recall task.
will be discussed later.

The explanation for this specific discrepancy
The word task may be more sensitive to mood

influence because it is less accurately recalled than the event recall
task.

Across manics and depressives, an average of 7.40 events were

remembered as opposed to only 4.20 words.

More accurate recall for

events was also shown by the amount of words and events interjected
into recall.

Subjects were less likely to interject additional events

into the story than additional words to the list (.175 events added and
.85 words added, respectively).

In sum, the present research success-

fully used word recall tasks as well as event recall tasks to demonstrate a relationship between mood and content of recall.

It was

additionally suggested that tasks involving word recall may be more
sensitive in demonstrating mood differences than tasks involving event
recall.
The results of this study were also consistent with several hypotheses proposed in Gundersen's research (Note 1) which used words as the
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recall stimuli.

First, that study hypothesized that cognitive differ-

ences shown by college students with a range of depressed to nondepressed moods were not different enough.

The same procedure used in

the present study with a clinical population did demonstrate cognitive
differences between manics and depressives for content of recall, content of interjections, affective ratings of stimuli, and chain associations to neutral words.
A second hypothesis suggested in Gundersen's preliminary research,
the importance of prerating affective content of the stimuli, was firmly
established in the present project by a close examination of the one
case of discrepant results (between the event and word task) mentioned
earlier.

A univariate contrast on the word task showed that manics

remembered significantly more happy than sad words while a similar contrast on an event recall task, surprisingly, did not.

Additionally, a

contrast showing the number of happy versus sad events recalled
approached significance,

~

= 1.9843,

~

=.054.

That is, sad events

provided a stronger stimuli for recall than happy events regardless
of subject mood.
found;

The discrepant results may be due to a stimulus con-

even though the happy events were mood-congruent for manics,

the sad events provided stronger stimuli, perhaps by being more affectively extreme.

This discrepancy may be due to the fact that the

affective content of the events was not prerated and counterbalanced as
were the words.

Upon scrutiny, the sad events in the story appear to

have a more extreme affect value than do the happy events (grandfather
dying, attendance at grandmother's funeral, and mother developing cancer
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versus holiday family gatherings, being with first girlfriend, and
being accepted in college).

Since no such main effect is evident in

the word recall task, it is plausible to hypothesize that differences
in recall of events across groups is related to possible differences
in the average affect values for happy and sad events in the story.
With this in mind, suggestions for future research would include using
stimuli which were prerated into several affective levels (very happy
stimuli, happy stimuli, neutral stimuli, sad stimuli, and very sad
stimuli).

Subjects could also be rated and divided into groups of an

equal number of mood levels.

This would allow the researcher to ob-

serve if subjects selectively learned material most congruent to their
affective state or material which was more extreme than (but still congruent to) their affective state.

Subjects' mood level could be

measured after the task to determine if their affective state had decreased, maintained, or increased intensity.
Some of the hypotheses in this project were not supported by the
data.

Specifically, the unsupported hypotheses included those regarding

a relationship between mood and:

the total amount of recall including

the role of motivation in recall, the amount of interjections into
recall, and the affective order of recall.
tions for these phenomena.

There are several explana-

One explanation for no differences between

manics and depressives on these measures is that there actually are no
cognitive differences of these kinds between the two groups.

An alter-

native explanation for the total recall similarities and the similarities
in the number of interjections between both groups, as well as the
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seemingly useless prompt measure may be the extremely low motivational
level of the typical veteran's administration psychiatric population.
The low number of responses recorded for all three measures is suggestive of a broad-based low level of motivation which could effectively
mask any real recall differences of this type between groups.

Although

the results did not support these additional hypotheses and alternative
explanations have been suggested, the data are not inconsistent with
Bower's preliminary research on mood and cognitive processes.
More theoretically, this research provides additional support
for Bower's notion of the associative network theory of memory and
emotion, i.e., emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into
associations with events.

It assumes that by spreading activation, a

dominant emotion will enhance the salience of congruent stimulus materials for learning, therefore also increasing the likelihood of mood
congruent material at the time of recall.

In this project, subjects

learned and therefore recalled more materials (events and words) which
were congruent with their emotional state than materials which were
incongruent to their emotional state.

Mood congruent recall is consis-

tent with Bower's network theory of emotion and memory.

The positive

relationship between the specific intensity of the mood congruent material and the extent of recall suggests that material which is extreme
in affect value is more memorable because while it is minimally resistant to or serves to heighten one's affective state, it may also be a
less common event therefore having less associations to other (possibly
inhibiting) stimuli.

More neutral stimuli may be remembered less often
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because in addition to not exclusively being paired with the subject's
current mood state, they are likely used in several other associative
networks and therefore less distinguishable to remember.

Hypotheses

suggested by previous researchers suggesting mood-congruence recall is
effective because it justifies the subject's state or because it reminds the subjects of an event in their own lives are not valid here
because the subjects were not hypnotized (so had no need to justify
their state) and the stimuli was not always in the form of events (to
serve as cues for the subject's own memory).
In addition to supporting Bower's associative network of emotion
and memory (reactive cognitive processes), the results of this project
support the relationship between mood and active cognitive productions.
Bower, Gilligan, and Monteiro (1982) demonstrate that although differences between the cognitions of happy and sad subjects show up in
recall, cognitive differences actually occur during the active process
of learning, probably in the form of selective attention to mood congruous material.

In addition to mood being related to cognitive reac-

tions to material more properly demonstrated by differences in affective ratings of material, that is, reactions to emotionally laden material, mood is also related to active cognitive productions.

Active

processes such as selective attention as demonstrated by differential
content of recall, material production as demonstrated by content of
words interjected, and associative thought processes as demonstrated by
associations to neutral words were shown.

In sum, the results of this

study emphasize the aspect of the associative network theory that
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relates mood to active cognitive productions forming a theoretical
framework for examining active thought processes as well as forming
a framework for examining memory.
In addition to its support of a theoretical framework, the re-

sults of this research may have some clinical relevance as well.

Al-

though the results for the present project are primarily statistically
significant rather than clinically observable it may be relevant for
the clinician to understand that patients' thought processes are closely
linked to their present mood.

This may be observably or statistically

demonstrated several possible ways in the therapy setting.

First, when

clients are presented with several pieces of information (whether it
be interpretations, alternative ways of viewing or dealing with a situation, or feedback) material which is mood congruent may be more salient therefore more easily learned and remembered by the client.

In

addition, extremely affect-laden (mood-congruent) material is more
likely to be selectively attended to and recalled than more neutral
material.

Secondly, when asked to actively produce material (alterna-

tive ways of viewing and dealing with situations), clients may have a
tendency to produce alternatives within a limited affective range, i.e.,
mood-congruent productions.

A third way in which the results of this

study may relate to client behavior in a clinical setting is an emotional bias in associations.

Manic and depressed patients chain associated

to neutral moods in observably different ways, the associations being
closely linked with the mood of the patient.

It is not currently known

if this bias is observable when associations are made to mood-congruent
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and mood-incongruent as well as neutral material.

In addition to being

aware of these chaining biases in therapy settings, it may be possible
to use chain associations to neutral words, since they are clinically
identifiable over 85% of the time, as additional projective measures of
affective states for diagnostic purposes and serially as a measure of
clinical improvement.

In sum, the results of the present research al-

though primarily statistically rather than clinically observable, show
possibilities for relevant use in clinical settings.
On a broader spectrum, this study contributes to the literature
on theories of depression and depressive behavior.

Research such as

this which observe specific relationships between mood and measures of
selective learning, memory, and associations, highlight the complex
relationship between affect and cognitions.

The results of this study

contributed to a theoretical framework which can form the basis for
clinical assessment and intervention in the future.

SUMMARY

This study investigated the relationship petween mood and two
cognitive processes, immediate recall and word associations.

Specif-

ically, the study looked at the relationship between the mood of manic
and depressed individuals in a Veteran's Administration psychiatric
population and the content of affect-laden recall, affective ratings
of stimuli, amount of total recall, amount and content of interjections,
ordering of recall, and chain associations to neutral words.

Manic

and depressed subjects were required to verbally recall stimuli from
a list of 21 affect-laden words, recall affect-laden events from a
short story, and chain associate to five neutral words.

A significant

relationship was found between mood and affective content of recall,
content of interjections, ratings of stimuli, and chain associations.
The task requiring the recall of affect-laden words appeared even more
sensitive to the mood of the subject than the event recall task.

The

importance of prerating and counterbalancing the affective content of
the stimuli was stressed.

The results of this study provided strong

support for preliminary resaerch on mood and cognitive processes and
for Bower's associative network theory of emotion and memory which
conceptualizes emotion as a memory unit affecting cognitions.

Specif-

ically, the results supported Bower's theory involving mood-congruous
memory and the active cognitive processes of selective attention ar.d
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mood-congruous associations.

Implications of these results for cogni-

tive theories of depression and for future clinical use were discussed.
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Paul Smith
Paul Smith had been seeing a psychiatrist for several sessions
now. They had been making some progress together, but Paul's ambivalence in certain areas of his experience still remained prominent. The
psychiatrist had suggested hypnotic age regression sessions as a possible therapeutic modality for him, so Paul had agreed.
The first trance experience uncovered some interesting childhood
experiences. At the age of 4, Paul remembered the happiness of playing
with his family at home. He recalled the glee and fascination when
he rode piggyback on his father's back, seeing the broad smile glistening on his mother's face, and the joyous laugh of his father's voice in
the background. He also recalled some sad experiences at this early
age. He recalled the overwhelming sadness when his dog was run over by
a car; his grief at his grandfather's death; and the despair of
watching a hard-earned quarter slip through the grating of the sewer.
He also recalled the giggles of his sibling as they lay awake at night
telling jokes, the happiness of his grandmother's face at his birthday
party, and the delight and joy present at holidy family gatherings.
In the second age regression he went back to his years in grammar
school. He recalled the sadness in being cut from his baseball team,
and the glumness encountered upon resignedly realizing the inevitability
of a return visit to the dreaded dentist. He also remembered the joy
and excitement in learning to spell his name properly, and the jubilation of receiving the top grade in his class. Additionally recalled
was the dismal and cheerless memory of staying inside on a gloomy, rainy
day, and his crestfallen stature upon receiving news of his sister's
auto accident. The session concluded with a termination of the trance,
and a brief discussion of the significance of the past events to the
present situation.
With the arrival of the third hypnosis session, the psychiatrist
informed Paul that he was relatively happy with the therapeutic progress. Paul, in return, stated he could feel happy, and that he could
also feel sad. An age regression trance to adolescent years was then
effected. In this trance, Paul recalled the happiness which enveloped
him when he was blissfully with his first girlfriend; he also sadly
remembered her family moving to another town. He re-experienced the
elation in scoring high on his SAT test, and the fantastic joy of being
accepted in college. Other memories included the sadness of departing
from his high school friend, and his sorrowful attendance at his grandmother's funeral. These experiences were interspersed with others that
included a jubilant back-packing outing in the mountains, a fun-filled
beer party with his close friends, and a despair-filled evening that
resulted from a sorrowful rejection by a steady date. After several
hours, the trance session was terminated and Paul left with a mixture
of feelings.
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He arrived somewhat depressed for the next session, but reported
he had been generally happy during the week. After brief casual conversation, an age regression trance was once again utilized. The
memories recalled in this session involved Paul's early teenage years.
He remembered the elation in hearing his first rock and roll album and
the high he felt in going to his first rock concert. He also recalled
the despondency experienced in hearing rumors of the breakup of the
Beatles, the despair of not obtaining tickets to a Rolling Stones concert, and the sadness in discovering a warp in a newly purchased double
album. Other memories quickly flashed through his awareness: the
delight of meeting an old friend, the jubilation of a last-second victory in a football game, and the hilarious performance of a stage
comedian in a night club. The thoughts continued at a quick but natural rate: The flunking of an important final exam; the grief in his
best friend's voice when he informed Paul of his rejection by college
admissions committees; the remorsefulness after losing his allowance;
and the overwhelming sorrow in hearing his mother had developed cancer.
Paul experienced himself as a passive but involved observer to these
fleeting incidents. However, as the session ended, he knew a shift
inside of him had occurred. He walked out of the office in deep internal p~ocesses.
When Paul returned to the office s~veral days later, he was in the
same state as when he left the last session. They discussed the various
outcomes of the age regression sessions, and decided that the therapeutic
investigation would continue, but no longer using hypnosis.
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